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(1) About insolubles, you need to know that some things are called 
“insolubles” by sophisters not because they can in no way be solved but rather 
because they are solved [only] with difficulty. 
(2) Thus, you need to know that sophisms are “insoluble” when, 5 
by apparent consequences that seem to be governed by necessary rules, from 
some contingent proposition its opposite is inferred. They are called “insolu-
bles” because it is difficult to block such consequences. 
(3) Such arguments cannot occur except when a human act regards 
(i) the term ‘false’ (or some similar [term]) affirmatively, or (ii) the term ‘true’ 10 
(or some similar [term]) negatively — as is the case for ‘Socrates is saying a 
falsehood’ (Sortes dicit falsum) and ‘Socrates is not saying a truth’ (Sortes 
non dicit verum). 
(4) An insoluble occurs like this: Let Socrates begin to say ‘Socra-
tes is saying a falsehood’, so that he is saying nothing else. And then I ask: Is 15 
Socrates saying a truth or is Socrates saying a falsehood? 
(5) If you say Socrates is saying a truth, he is not saying [anything] 
but the proposition ‘Socrates is saying a falsehood’; therefore ‘Socrates is say-
ing a falsehood’ is true. Consequently, Socrates is saying a falsehood. So, if 
he saying a truth he is saying a falsehood. 20 
(6) If you say Socrates is saying a falsehood, therefore ‘Socrates is 
saying a falsehood’ is true; and Socrates is saying that; therefore, Socrates is 
saying that which is true. Consequently, Socrates is saying a truth. So, posit-
ing this case, if Socrates is saying a falsehood he is saying a truth. 
(7) This argument is called insoluble, because it is solved [only] 25 
with difficulty. 
(8) For the solution of this and all other [insolubles], you need to 
know that such a contingent proposition, from which [a proposition] incom-
patible with it should be inferred, either has (a) the term ‘false’ (or some simi-
lar [term]) or (b) the term ‘true’ (or some similar [term]). 30 
(9) If (a) the former, [the proposition] has to be affirmative, and it 
has to be said that it is false. Thus, if Socrates begins to say ‘Socrates is saying 
a falsehood’, it has to be said that this proposition is false. But if he began to 
say ‘Socrates is not saying a falsehood’, such an apparent  argument could not 
be made. 35 
(10) If however (b) the proposition contains the term ‘true’ (or some 
similar [term]), [the proposition] has to be negative. And in that case it is to be 
granted that the proposition is true. For example, if Socrates begins to say 
‘Socrates is not saying a truth’, it is to be granted that this is true. 
3 
(11) And if it is argued: If this is true: ‘Socrates is not saying a 40 
truth’, and Socrates says this proposition, therefore Socrates says a true propo-
sition — it is to be said that the consequence ‘Socrates says this proposition; 
and this proposition is true; therefore, Socrates says a true proposition’ is not 
valid. The reason for this denial is that in the proposition ‘Socrates is not say-
ing a truth’ the predicate cannot supposit for the whole proposition of which it 45 
is a part, although not precisely on account of its being its part. 
(12) Therefore, the proposition ‘Socrates is not saying a truth’ is 
equivalent to ‘Socrates is not saying a truth other than “Socrates is not saying 
a truth”’. Therefore, just as it does not follow: ‘This is true; and Socrates says 
this; therefore, he says a true proposition other than this’, so it does not fol-50 
low: ‘Socrates says the proposition “Socrates is not saying a truth”; and this is 
true; therefore, Socrates is saying a truth’. This is because, as was said, these 
two are equivalent: ‘Socrates is not saying a truth’ and ‘Socrates is not saying 
a truth other than “Socrates is not saying a truth.”’ 
(13) It is to be replied to the preceding argument1 in the same way, 55 
analogously. For when Socrates begins to say ‘Socrates is saying a falsehood’, 
and it is asked “Is Socrates saying a truth or a falsehood”?, it is to be said that 
Socrates says neither a truth nor a falsehood, just as it is to be granted that he 
says neither a truth nor a falsehood other than this. And in that case it does not 
follow: ‘This is true: “Socrates is saying a falsehood”; and Socrates is saying 60 
this; therefore, Socrates is saying a falsehood’, just as it does not follow: ‘Soc-
rates is saying this; and this is false; therefore, Socrates is saying a falsehood 
other than this’. This is because these two propositions are equivalent: ‘Socra-
tes is saying a falsehood’ and ‘Socrates is saying a falsehood other than this’, 
because of the fact that in ‘Socrates is saying a falsehood’ the predicate cannot 65 
supposit for this proposition. 
(14) And if is said:  Here the argument is from an inferior to a supe-
rior without negation and without distribution; therefore, the consequence is a 
good one — it is to be said that the consequence2 is not valid except when the 
superior in the consequent can supposit for the inferior. Thus if, in ‘A man is 70 
an animal’, ‘animal’ could not supposit for a man, the consequence ‘Socrates 
is a man; therefore, Socrates is an animal’ would not be valid. But in ‘Socrates 
is saying a falsehood’, the predicate cannot supposit for the whole proposition; 
therefore, ‘Socrates is saying this falsehood; therefore, Socrates is saying a 
falsehood’ does not follow. 75 
1 See para. (4). 
2 That is, the consequence at the beginning of this sentence, in para. (14), not to the 
argument being referred to, back in para. (13) 
4 
(15) By means of what has been said [above], the studious person 
can reply to all insolubles, if in solving them he wants to pay diligent attention 
to and inquire [into] the nature of insolubles. I leave this to clever people, be-
cause I inserted these [materials] about obligations3 and insolubles only to fill 
out this Summulae and lest so great a part of logic be left completely un-80 
touched. 
3 Summa logicae, III.3.39–42, are about the peculiar mediaeval disputation form 
known as obligationes (= “obligations”). 
